Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games
(The Churchill lectures in economic theory)
Cambridge University Press, 2000
- : hbk
- : pbk
Available at / 58 libraries
-
Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB) Library , Kobe University図書
: pbk338.7-170081000094900
-
Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: hbkT||330.1||S81378624
-
Hiroshima University Central Library, Interlibrary Loan
: hbk331.19:G-17/724773483500420597,
: pbk331.19:G-17/724749243530408817 -
No Libraries matched.
- Remove all filters.
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-213) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.
Table of Contents
- 1. Markets and games
- 2. Perfect competition
- 3. Continuity and anonymity
- 4. Bounded rationality
- 5. Afterthoughts.
by "Nielsen BookData"