Perfect deterrence
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Perfect deterrence
(Cambridge studies in international relations, 72)
Cambridge University Press, 2000
- : hbk
- : pbk
Available at 24 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 384-404) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
Table of Contents
- Part I. Theoretical Underpinnings: 1. Classical deterrence theory
- 2. Rationality and deterrence
- 3. Credibility: the magic ingredient of deterrence
- Part II. Direct Deterrence: 4. Uncertainty and mutual deterrence
- 5. Unilateral deterrence
- Part III. Extended Deterrence: 6. Extended deterrence
- 7. Modeling massive retaliation
- 8. Modeling flexible response
- 9. Crisis, escalation, and limited war
- Part IV. Implications: 10. Perfect deterrence theory.
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