Theory of knowledge
著者
書誌事項
Theory of knowledge
（Dimensions of philosophy series）
Westview Press, 2000
2nd ed
- : pbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. 233-242
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this impressive second edition of Theory of Knowledge, Keith Lehrer introduces students to the major traditional and contemporary accounts of knowing. Beginning with the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Lehrer explores the truth, belief, and justification conditions on the way to a thorough examination of foundation theories of knowledge,the work of Platinga, externalism and naturalized epistemologies, internalism and modern coherence theories, contextualism, and recent reliabilist and causal theories. Lehrer gives all views careful examination and concludes that external factors must be matched by appropriate internal factors to yield knowledge. This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer's new coherence theory of undefeated justification. In addition to doing justice to the living epistemological traditions, the text smoothly integrates several new lines that will interest scholars. Also, a feature of special interest is Lehrer's concept of a justification game.This second edition of Theory of Knowledge is a thoroughly revised and updated version that contains several completely new chapters. Written by a well-known scholar and contributor to modern epistemology, this text is distinguished by clarity of structure, accessible writing, and an elegant mix of traditional material, contemporary ideas, and well-motivated innovation.
目次
Preface to the First Edition -- Preface to the Second Edition -- The Analysis of Knowledge -- Truth and Acceptance -- The Foundation Theory: Infallible Foundationalism -- Fallible Foundations -- The Explanatory Coherence Theory -- Internal Coherence and Personal Justification -- Coherence, Truth, and Undefeated Justification -- Externalism and the Truth Connection -- Skepticism, Virtue, and Context
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