The causal structure of long-term supply relationships : an empirical test of a generalized transaction cost theory
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The causal structure of long-term supply relationships : an empirical test of a generalized transaction cost theory
Kluwer Academic Publishers, c2000
Available at 16 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
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  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
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  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
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  United Kingdom
  Germany
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  France
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [147]-155)
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Long-term supply relationships are of crucial importance in industrial organization. The present (r)evolution in information and communication technology such as e-business is proof of the increasingly dynamic environment in which firms operate. As a result, firms have to focus on their core competencies and obtain complementary ones from partner firms to be able to survive. This can hardly be realized without having long-term supply relationships. In the past decades, research on strategic alliances -the class of interfirm arrangements to which long-term supply relationships belong mushroomed. Many ofthe (empirical) studies in the alliance literature focus on a single variable that is then explained by a set of independent variables. For example, for international joint ventures the level of commitment, interdependence, asymmetry, and dedicated investments explains the development of trust. By itself there is nothing wrong in this approach. On the contrary, because of all these studies we now have some knowledge about the reasons why firms enter in alliances and why some alliances are more successful than others. In fact, one of our first studies also belonged to this research-tradition.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction.- 1.1 Scope and Purpose.- 1.2 Overview of Theory.- 1.3 Overview of Empirical Results.- 2 Theoretical Background.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.3 Limitations of Transaction Cost Economics.- 2.4 Competencies.- 2.5 Relational Features.- 2.5.1 Commitment.- 2.5.2 Trust.- 2.6 Conclusions.- 3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Definitions and Related Research.- 3.3 The Theoretical Model.- 3.3.1 Asset Specificity.- 3.3.2 Uncertainty.- 3.3.3 Value of the Partner.- 3.3.4 Commitment.- 3.3.5 Trust.- 3.4 Conclusions.- 4 Methods and Data.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 A LISREL Approach.- 4.2.1 Models, Methods and Matrices.- 4.2.2 Model-Fit and Model-Modification.- 4.3 The Samples.- 4.4 Operationalization.- 4.5 Conclusions.- 5 Empirical Results.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The United States.- 5.2.1 Measurement Models.- 5.2.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.3 Japan.- 5.3.1 Measurement Models.- 5.3.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.4 Europe.- 5.4.1 Measurement Models.- 5.4.2 Testing the Hypotheses and Model-Fit.- 5.5 Conclusions.- 6 An International Comparison.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The Convergence of Long-Term Supply Relationships.- 6.2.1 A First Perspective on the Convergence.- 6.2.2 The United States versus Japan.- 6.2.3 The United States versus Europe.- 6.2.4 Japan versus Europe.- 6.3 The Third Way.- 6.4 Causal Loops.- 6.5 Conclusions.- 6.5.1 Point of Departure.- 6.5.2 Convergence within the Triad.- 6.5.3 Explaining the Convergence.- 6.5.4 Limitations and Further Research.- Appendix A Constructs, Items And Scales.
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