Ethical relativity
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Ethical relativity
（International library of philosophy, . Ethics and political philosophy ; 6）
Routledge, 2000, c1932
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Note
First published in 1932 by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This is Volume of VI Of six in a series on Ethic and Political Philosophy. Originally published in 1932, this study looks at how the emotional origin of moral judgments consistently leads to a denial of the objective validity ascribed to them both by common sense and by normative theories of ethics.
Table of Contents
I. THE SUPPOSED OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS II. THE SUPPOSED OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS (CONCLUDED) III. THE MORAL EMOTIONS IV. THE MORAL EMOTIONs (CONCLUDED) V. THE MORAL CONCEPTS VI. THE SUBJECTs OF MORAL JUDGMENTS VII. THE VARIABILITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS VIII. THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND OF NORMATIVE THEORIES IX. THE EMOTIONAL BACKGROUND OF NORMATIVE THEORIES (CONCLUDED)
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