Two strategies for Europe : De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance
著者
書誌事項
Two strategies for Europe : De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance
Rowman & Littlefield, c2001
- : hbk
- : pbk
- タイトル別名
-
Deux stratégies pour l'Europe
大学図書館所蔵 全16件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-271) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hbk ISBN 9780847695300
内容説明
This timely book explores the often stormy French-U.S. relationship and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958D1969). The first work on this subject to draw on previously inaccessible material from U.S. and French archives, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of Gaullist policies toward NATO and the United States during the 1960s, a period that reached its apogee with de GaulleOs dramatic decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATOOs integrated military arm. This launched the French policy of autonomy within NATO, which has since been adapted without having been abandoned. De GaulleOs policy often has been caricatured by admirers and detractors alike as an expression of nationalism or anti-Americanism. Yet Frederic Bozo argues that although it did reflect the GeneralOs quest for grandeur, it also, and perhaps more important, stemmed from a genuine strategy designed to build an independent Europe and to help overcome the system of blocs. Indeed, the author contends, de GaulleOs actions forced NATO to adapt to new strategic realities. Retracing the different phases of de GaulleOs policies, Bozo provides valuable insight into current French approaches to foreign and security policy, including the recent attempt by President Chirac to redefine and normalize the France-NATO relationship. As the author shows, de GaulleOs legacy remains vigorous as France grapples with European integration, a new role within a reformed NATO, and relations with the United States.
目次
Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 1958: De Gaulle Hoists His Colors Chapter 3 The Time of Crises (1959-1960) Chapter 4 From Berlin to Cuba (1961-1962) Chapter 5 The Power to Say No (1963-1964) Chapter 6 The End of Subordination (1965-June, 1966) Chapter 7 One Alliance, Two Strategies (July 1966-1967) Chapter 8 Confirmation of the Status Quo (1968-April 1969) Chapter 9 Conclusion
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780847695317
内容説明
This timely book explores the often stormy French-U.S. relationship and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969). The first work on this subject to draw on previously inaccessible material from U.S. and French archives, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of Gaullist policies toward NATO and the United States during the 1960s, a period that reached its apogee with de Gaulle's dramatic decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO's integrated military arm. This launched the French policy of autonomy within NATO, which has since been adapted without having been abandoned. De Gaulle's policy often has been caricatured by admirers and detractors alike as an expression of nationalism or anti-Americanism. Yet Frederic Bozo argues that although it did reflect the General's quest for grandeur, it also, and perhaps more important, stemmed from a genuine strategy designed to build an independent Europe and to help overcome the system of blocs. Indeed, the author contends, de Gaulle's actions forced NATO to adapt to new strategic realities. Retracing the different phases of de Gaulle's policies, Bozo provides valuable insight into current French approaches to foreign and security policy, including the recent attempt by President Chirac to redefine and normalize the France-NATO relationship. As the author shows, de Gaulle's legacy remains vigorous as France grapples with European integration, a new role within a reformed NATO, and relations with the United States.
目次
Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 1958: De Gaulle Hoists His Colors Chapter 3 The Time of Crises (1959-1960) Chapter 4 From Berlin to Cuba (1961-1962) Chapter 5 The Power to Say No (1963-1964) Chapter 6 The End of Subordination (1965-June, 1966) Chapter 7 One Alliance, Two Strategies (July 1966-1967) Chapter 8 Confirmation of the Status Quo (1968-April 1969) Chapter 9 Conclusion
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