Consciousness and intentionality

Author(s)
Bibliographic Information

Consciousness and intentionality

Grant R. Gillett, John McMillan

(Advances in consciousness research, v. 27)

J. Benjamins Pub. Co., c2001

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  • : us

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. [255]-260) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Is there an internal relationship between consciousness and intentionality? Can mental content be described in such a way so as to avoid dualism? What is the influence of social context upon consciousness, conceptions of self and mental content? This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major tenets. Focusing upon the rule governed nature of concepts and the grounding of the rules for concept use in the practical world, intentional consciousness emerges as a phenomena that depends upon social context. Given that dependence, the authors consider and set aside attempts to reduce human consciousness and intentionality to phenomena explicable at biological or neuroscientific levels. (Series A)

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. 1. Consciousness and intentionality - foundations
  • 3. 2. Language and consciousness
  • 4. 3. The objects of consciousness
  • 5. 4. Consciousness and action
  • 6. 5. Consciousness and society
  • 7. 6. Consciousness and the brain
  • 8. 7. Animal consciousness
  • 9. 8. Anomalies of consciousness
  • 10. Consciousness and intentionality: some conclusions
  • 11. Glossary
  • 12. References
  • 13. Index

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Details
  • NCID
    BA5197061X
  • ISBN
    • 9027251479
    • 155619997X
  • LCCN
    00063052
  • Country Code
    ne
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Amsterdam ; Philadelphia
  • Pages/Volumes
    x, 263 p.
  • Size
    22 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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