Natural law and practical rationality

Bibliographic Information

Natural law and practical rationality

Mark C. Murphy

(Cambridge studies in philosophy and law)

Cambridge University Press, 2001

  • : hbk
  • : pbk

Available at  / 14 libraries

Search this Book/Journal

Note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Natural law theory has been undergoing a revival, especially in political philosophy and jurisprudence. Yet, most fundamentally, natural law theory is not a political theory, but a moral theory, or more accurately a theory of practical rationality. According to the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational standards. These standards are justified by reference to features of the human goods that are the fundamental reasons for action. This book is a defence of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, demonstrating its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian and virtue accounts.

Table of Contents

  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction: natural law and the theory of practical rationality
  • 1. The real identity thesis
  • 2. Well-being
  • 3. The reasons that make action intelligible
  • 4. Welfarism and its discontents
  • 5. The principles that make choice reasonable
  • 6. What ought to be done
  • Note
  • Works cited
  • Index.

by "Nielsen BookData"

Related Books: 1-1 of 1

Details

  • NCID
    BA52684671
  • ISBN
    • 9780521802291
    • 9780521039772
  • LCCN
    00045551
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge
  • Pages/Volumes
    xiv, 284 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
Page Top