The explanationist defense of scientific realism


The explanationist defense of scientific realism

Dorit A. Ganson

(Studies in philosophy)

Garland, 2001


The explanationist defense of scientific reason

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 7



Title misprinted in some impression: The explanationist defense of scientific reason

Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-203) and index



Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies.


  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction
  • I. Explanationism
  • I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
  • I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
  • I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
  • II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
  • II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
  • II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
  • II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
  • III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
  • 2. Acausal Models of Explanation
  • II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
  • II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
  • III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
  • III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
  • III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
  • III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
  • III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
  • 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
  • I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
  • II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
  • II.i The Scientific Image
  • II.ii Laws and Symmetry
  • III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
  • III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
  • III.ii Flaws in the Argument
  • III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
  • 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
  • I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
  • II. The Principle of Reflection
  • III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
  • IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
  • 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
  • I. Smart's "Wouldn't It be a Miracle?" Argument
  • II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
  • II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
  • II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
  • II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
  • III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
  • 6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
  • I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
  • II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
  • III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
  • IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
  • Appendix
  • I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
  • II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
  • Works Cited
  • Index

「Nielsen BookData」 より

関連文献: 1件中  1-1を表示