The explanationist defense of scientific realism
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Bibliographic Information
The explanationist defense of scientific realism
(Studies in philosophy)
Garland, 2001
- Other Title
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The explanationist defense of scientific reason
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Note
Title misprinted in some impression: The explanationist defense of scientific reason
Includes bibliographical references (p. [201]-203) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies.
Table of Contents
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- I. Explanationism
- I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
- I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
- I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
- II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
- II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
- II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
- II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
- III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
- 2. Acausal Models of Explanation
- II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
- II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
- III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
- III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
- III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
- III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
- III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
- 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
- I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
- II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
- II.i The Scientific Image
- II.ii Laws and Symmetry
- III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
- III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
- III.ii Flaws in the Argument
- III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
- 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
- I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
- II. The Principle of Reflection
- III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
- IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
- 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
- I. Smart's "Wouldn't It be a Miracle?" Argument
- II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
- II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
- II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
- II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
- III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
- 6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
- I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
- II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
- III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
- IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
- Appendix
- I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
- II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
- Works Cited
- Index
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