Constitutional culture and democratic rule
著者
書誌事項
Constitutional culture and democratic rule
(Murphy Institute studies in political economy)
Cambridge University Press, 2001
- : hbk
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全16件
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  香川
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  佐賀
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy.
目次
- Part I. Constitutional Democracy: Beginnings and Traditions: Editors' introduction
- 1. Constitutional problematics, circa 1787 Jack N. Rakove
- 2. Inventing constitutional traditions: the poverty of fatalism James Johnson
- 3. The birth logic of a democratic constitution Lawrence G. Sager
- Part II. Constitutional Structure and Design: 4. Constitutional democracy as a two-stage game Jonathan Riley
- 5. Imagining another Madisonian Republic Jonathan Riley
- 6. One and three: separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in the Italian constitution Pasquale Pasquino
- 7. A political theory of Federalism Jenna Bednar
- Part III. Constitutional Change and Stability: 8. Designing an amendment process Sanford Levinson
- 9. Constitutional theory transformed Stephen M. Griffin
- 10. Constitutional economic transition Russel Hardin
- 11. Institutionalizing constitutional interpretation Jack Knight.
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