Constitutional culture and democratic rule
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Constitutional culture and democratic rule
(Murphy Institute studies in political economy)
Cambridge University Press, 2001
- : hbk
- : pbk
Available at 16 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This volume investigates the nature of constitutional democratic government in the United States and elsewhere. The editors introduce a basic conceptual framework which the contributors clarify and develop in eleven essays organized into three separate sections. The first section deals with constitutional founding and the founders' use of cultural symbols and traditions to facilitate acceptance of a new regime. The second discusses alternative constitutional structures and their effects on political outcomes. The third focuses on processes of constitutional change and on why founders might choose to make formal amendments relatively difficult or easy to achieve. The book is distinctive because it provides comprehensive tools for analyzing and comparing different forms of constitutional democracy. These tools are discussed in ways that will be of interest to students and readers in political science, law, history and political philosophy.
Table of Contents
- Part I. Constitutional Democracy: Beginnings and Traditions: Editors' introduction
- 1. Constitutional problematics, circa 1787 Jack N. Rakove
- 2. Inventing constitutional traditions: the poverty of fatalism James Johnson
- 3. The birth logic of a democratic constitution Lawrence G. Sager
- Part II. Constitutional Structure and Design: 4. Constitutional democracy as a two-stage game Jonathan Riley
- 5. Imagining another Madisonian Republic Jonathan Riley
- 6. One and three: separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in the Italian constitution Pasquale Pasquino
- 7. A political theory of Federalism Jenna Bednar
- Part III. Constitutional Change and Stability: 8. Designing an amendment process Sanford Levinson
- 9. Constitutional theory transformed Stephen M. Griffin
- 10. Constitutional economic transition Russel Hardin
- 11. Institutionalizing constitutional interpretation Jack Knight.
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