Rules, choice and strategy : the political economy of Italian electoral reform
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Rules, choice and strategy : the political economy of Italian electoral reform
(Locke Institute)
E. Elgar, c2001
Available at 15 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Bibliography: p. 191-212
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
The design of an electoral system is fundamental to any democracy. It is through electoral systems that the commitment of a society to a political system is achieved. The peculiarities of an electoral system assume significant importance in periods in which democratic polities seem caught between a crisis of confidence in their representative systems and mass apathy over the product of government - as has recently occurred in Italy.Electoral rules constrain available choice alternatives and therefore have profound effects on governance of a country since different electoral rules generate different outcome patterns even with no change in the identity of candidates. The two most common electoral schemes are proportional representation and plurality. The theoretical debate concerning these two systems is of intense interest not least because of the importance of finding a stable, democratic and representative institutional structure that can be employed worldwide.
This topical book analyses the change of electoral rules in Italy from proportional representation toward plurality. While Italy is used as the illustrative case, the analysis has far-ranging theoretical and practical implications, and will therefore be of interest to academics and researchers of political economy, constitutionalism and public choice.
Table of Contents
Contents: Foreword by Charles K. Rowley Part I: Introduction 1. Overview 2. A History of the Italian Political System - 1913 to the Present Part II: Economics and Elections: The Key Tools 3. The Economics of Elections - A Review of the Literature 4. Electoral Systems, Electoral Formulae and Italian Electoral Rules Part III: Choices Between Rules 5. Information and Voting in Municipal Elections 6. Information, Proportionality and Power Dilution in Provisional Elections Part IV: Choices Subject to Rules 7. Party Electoral Strategies under the New Rules 8. Political Coalition Formation under the New Rules Part V: Rules, Choice and Strategy 9. Election Simulation and the Nature of Constitutional Choices 10. Summary and Evaluation Bibliography Index
by "Nielsen BookData"