Signaling games in political science
著者
書誌事項
Signaling games in political science
（Harwood fundamentals of pure and applied economics / editors in chief, J. Lesourne, H. Sonnenschein, 27 . Positive political economy 2 ; 2）
Routledge, 2001
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注記
Reprint. Originally published: Chur, Switzerland : Harwood Academic Publishers, c1991. (Fundamentals of pure and applied economics ; v. 46. Political science and economics section)
Bibliography: p. 86-89
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Considers the impact of game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics paying particular attention to the presence of information asymmetries.
目次
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The Basic Model
- Chapter 3 Agenda Control
- Chapter 4 Rhetoric and Debate
- Chapter 5 Electoral Competition
- Chapter 6 Reputation and Leadership
- Chapter 7 Crisis Bargaining
- Chapter 8 Voting with Incomplete Information
- Chapter 9 Discussion
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