Signaling games in political science

書誌事項

Signaling games in political science

Jeffrey S. Banks

(Harwood fundamentals of pure and applied economics / editors in chief, J. Lesourne, H. Sonnenschein, 27 . Positive political economy 2 ; 2)

Routledge, 2001

この図書・雑誌をさがす
注記

Reprint. Originally published: Chur, Switzerland : Harwood Academic Publishers, c1991. (Fundamentals of pure and applied economics ; v. 46. Political science and economics section)

Bibliography: p. 86-89

Includes index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Considers the impact of game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics paying particular attention to the presence of information asymmetries.

目次

  • Chapter 1 Introduction
  • Chapter 2 The Basic Model
  • Chapter 3 Agenda Control
  • Chapter 4 Rhetoric and Debate
  • Chapter 5 Electoral Competition
  • Chapter 6 Reputation and Leadership
  • Chapter 7 Crisis Bargaining
  • Chapter 8 Voting with Incomplete Information
  • Chapter 9 Discussion

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