Intuitions as evidence
著者
書誌事項
Intuitions as evidence
（A Garland series, . Dissertations in philosophy / edited by Robert Nozick）
Garland Pub., 2000
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-132) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge.
目次
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1: The Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy
- Chapter 2: The Nature of Philosophical Intuitions
- Chapter 3: Empiricist Explanationist Skepticism About Intuitions
- Chapter 4: Problems with the Empiricist Skeptical Argument
- Chapter 5: Reliability, Epistemic Circularity, and the Undue Partially of Empiricist Skepticism About Intuitions
- References
- Index
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