Knowledge by agreement : the programme of communitarian epistemology
著者
書誌事項
Knowledge by agreement : the programme of communitarian epistemology
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 2002
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全8件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Knowledge by Agreement defends the ideas that knowledge is a social status (like money, or marriage), and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. Part I develops a new theory of testimony. It breaks with the traditional view according to which testimony is not, except accidentally, a generative source of knowledge. One important consequence of the new theory is a rejection of attempts to globally justify trust in the words of others. Part II proposes a communitarian theory of empirical knowledge. Martin Kusch argues that empirical belief can acquire the status of knowledge only by being shared with others, and that all empirical beliefs presuppose social institutions. As a result all knowledge is essentially political. Part III defends some of the controversial premises and consequences of Parts I and II: the community-dependence of normativity, epistemological and semantic relativism, anti-realism, and a social conception of objectivity. Martin Kusch's bold approach to epistemology is a challenge to philosophy and will arouse interest in the wider academic world.
目次
- Introduction
- 1. Questions and Positions
- 2. The Limits of Testimony
- 3. Inferentialism - Pro and Contra
- 4. The Global Justification of Testimony
- 5. Testimony in Communitarian Epistemology
- 6. Summary
- 7. Questions about Rationality
- 8. Foundationalism and Coherentism
- 9. Direct Realism and Reliabilism
- 10. Consensualism and Interpretationalism
- 11. Contextualism and Communitarianism
- 12. Summary
- 13. Beyond Epistemology
- 14. Normativity and Community
- 15. Meaning Finitism
- 16. Truth
- 17. Reality
- 18. Objectivity
- 19. Relativism
- 20. Summary
- Epilogue
- References, Index
「Nielsen BookData」 より