The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication
著者
書誌事項
The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 2002
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 236-243) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus.
目次
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1. Universals, predication and truth
- 2. The univocity of truth
- 3. The correspondence theory for predicative sentences
- 4. Russell's theory of truth and its principal problems
- 5. How predicative beliefs correspond to the world
- 6. The metaphysics of facts
- 7. The metaphysics of propositions
- 8. The correspondence theory and complex propositions
- Bibliography
- Index.
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