Handbook of social choice and welfare
著者
書誌事項
Handbook of social choice and welfare
(Handbooks in economics, 19)
North-Holland : Elsevier Science, 2002-c2011
- v. 1
- v. 2
- タイトル別名
-
Social choice and welfare
大学図書館所蔵 全159件
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  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
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  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
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注記
Other title from spine of vol. 2
Vol. 2 has no series number
Includes bibliographies and indexes
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
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v. 2 ISBN 9780444508942
内容説明
This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods.
目次
Preface to Volume 2
Part 5: Foundations. 13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow) 14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen). 15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond) 16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. Lopez-Calva)
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes. 17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark) 18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent) 19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb)
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice 20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett) 21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson) 22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet) 23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura) 24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster)
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness 25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera) 26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin). 27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).
- 巻冊次
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v. 1 ISBN 9780444829146
内容説明
The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making.
目次
Preface to Volume 1 (K. Arrow, A. Sen, K. Suzumura). Introduction (K. Suzumura). Part 1. Arrovian Impossibility Theorems. 1. Impossibility theorems in the Arrovian framework (D. Campbell, J. Kelly). 2. Categories of Arrovian voting schemes (F. Aleskerov). 3. Domain restrictions (W. Gaertner). Part 2. Voting Schemes and Mechanisms. 4. Voting procedures (S. Brams, P. Fishburn). 5. Implementation theory (E. Maskin, T. Sjoestroem). 6. Axiomatic cost and surplus-sharing (H. Moulin). Part 3. Structure of Social Choice Rules. 7. Positional rules of collective decision-making (P. Pattanaik). 8. Game-Theoretic Analysis of voting in committees (B. Peleg). 9. Representative democracy and social choice theory (N. Schofield). Part 4. Welfare, Justice and Poverty. 10. Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability (C. d'Aspremont, L. Gevers). 11. Utilitarianism and the theory of justice (C. Blackorby, W. Bossert, D. Donaldson). 12. Inequality, poverty and welfare (B. Dutta).
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