Deontic morality and control
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Deontic morality and control
(Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa)
Cambridge University Press, 2002
Available at 3 libraries
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 272-281) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.
Table of Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1. Introduction
- Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control
- 3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control
- 4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some objections
- 5. Determinism and deontic anchors
- Part II. Indeterminism and Deontic Morality: 6. Transition: from determinism to indeterminism
- 7. Robust modest R-libertarianism and luck
- 8. Robust model R-libertarianism and deontic anchors
- Part III. Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors: 9. The significance of the possibility of being without deontic anchors
- 10. Determinism, deontic anchors and appraisability
- 11. Virtue ethics without metaphysical freedom
- 12. On the connection between morality's dethronement and deontic anchors
- 13. Concluding remarks
- Notes
- Glossary and list of principles
- References
- Index.
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