Deliberate discretion? : the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy
著者
書誌事項
Deliberate discretion? : the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy
（Cambridge studies in comparative politics）
Cambridge University Press, 2002
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-274) and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.
目次
- 1. Laws, bureaucratic autonomy and the comparative study of delegation
- 2. Rational delegation or helpless abdication? The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians
- 3. Statutes as blueprints for policy making processes
- 4. A comparative theory of legislative discretion and the policy making process
- 5. Legislation, agency policy making and Medicaid in Michigan
- 6. The design of laws across separation of powers systems
- 7. The design of laws across parliamentary systems
- 8. Laws, institutions, and policy making processes.
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