Public choice III

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Public choice III

Dennis C. Mueller

Cambridge University Press, 2003

  • : pbk
  • : hbk

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Note

"This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public choice II"--Prelim

Bibliography: p. 683-747

Includes indexes

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • Part I. Origins of the State: 2. The reason for collective choice - allocative efficiency
  • 3. The reason for collective choice - redistribution
  • Part II. Public Choice in a Direct Democracy: 4. The choice of voting rule
  • 5. Majority rule - positive properties
  • 6. Majority rule - normative properties
  • 7. Simple alternatives to majority rule
  • 8. Complicated alternatives to majority rule
  • 9. Exit, voice and disloyalty
  • Part III. Public Choice in a Representative Democracy: 10. Federalism
  • 11. Two-party competition - deterministic voting
  • 12. Two-party competition - probabilistic voting
  • 13. Multiparty systems
  • 14. The paradox of voting
  • 15. Rent seeking
  • 16. Bureaucracy
  • 17. Legislatures and bureaucracies
  • 18. Dictatorship
  • Part IV. Applications and Testing: 19. Political competition and macroeconomic performance
  • 20. Interest groups, campaign contributions and lobbying
  • 21. The size of government
  • 22. Government size and economic performance
  • Part V. Normative public choice: 23. Social welfare functions
  • 24. The impossibility of a social ordering
  • 25. A just social contract
  • 26. The constitution as a utilitarian contract
  • 27. Liberal rights and social choices
  • Part VI. What Have We Learned?: 28. Has public choice contributed anything to the study of politics?
  • 29. Allocation, redistribution, and public choice.

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