Logic, convention, and common knowledge : a conventionalist account of logic
著者
書誌事項
Logic, convention, and common knowledge : a conventionalist account of logic
(CSLI lecture notes, no. 142)
CSLI Publications, c2003
- : pbk
- : hbk
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注記
Bibliography: p. 149-154
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events - a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.
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