The political economy of monetary institutions
著者
書誌事項
The political economy of monetary institutions
（International organization readers）
MIT Press, c2003
- : pbk
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注記
"A special issue of International organization"
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Political economists consider the political and economic factors that affect a country's choice of monetary institutions.
Recent analysis by political economists of monetary institution determinants in different countries has been limited by the fact that exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions are studied in isolation from each other, without examining how one institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and level of central bank independence together; the articles (originally published in a special issue of International Organization) constitute a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The contributors consider both economic and political factors to explain a country's choice of monetary institutions, and examine the effect of political processes in democracies, including interest group pressure, on the balance between economic and distributional policy.
目次
- The political economy of monetary institutions, William J. Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, William Roberts Clark
- partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital, William Roberts Clark
- checks and balances, private information and the credibility of monetary commitments, Philip Keefer, David Stasavage
- veto players and the choice of monetary institutions, Mark Hallerberg
- political parties and monetary commitments, William Bernhard, David Leblang
- real sources of European currency policy - sectoral interests and European monetary integration, Jeffrey A. Freiden
- political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes, J. Lawrence Broz
- competing commitments - technocracy and democracy in the design of monetary institutions, John R. Freeman.
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