Coalitions in oligopolies : an introduction to the sequential procedure

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Bibliographic Information

Coalitions in oligopolies : an introduction to the sequential procedure

Murray Brown and Shin-Hwan Chiang

(Contributions to economic analysis, 259)

Elsevier, 2003

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 229-238) and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This book examines sequential coalition formation in oligopolies. Coalitions refer to mergers and acquisitions, cartels, and associations. The principal aim is the prediction and explanation of the coalition structure - whether an industry will emerge as a monopoly, say, or as a collection of sub-coalitions. In environments where decisions to form coalitions are made sequentially, the prediction and explanation of the equilibrium coalition structure can differ dramatically from the textbook simultaneous-move model. This difference derives from the knowledge effect, which is unique to the sequential-move models.

Table of Contents

Abbreviated Contents. I Symmetric oligopoly. 1. The basic oligopoly model. 2. Cost savings due to synergies. II Uncertainty, financial decisions, and managerial incentives. 3. Market volatility and coalitions. 4. Real and financial decisions. 5. Coalitions and incentives. III Coalition theory and sequential procedures. 6. Coalitions without externalities. 7. Coalitions with externalities. 8. Who moves first? Bibliography. Index.

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