The development of RAF strategic bombing doctrine, 1919-1939
著者
書誌事項
The development of RAF strategic bombing doctrine, 1919-1939
（Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought）
Praeger, 1995
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-184) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The history of strategic bombing is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of strategic bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.
目次
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
Strategic Bombing as an Idea: The Relationship of Theory and Strategy
The Role of Theory
Early Experience with "Strategic" Air Power
The Foundations of Independent Air Power
The Theory of the Strategic Offensive and the Battles in Whitehall
The Development of Doctrine in the RAF
Equipment Policy and Aircraft Development
Equipping the Bomber Aircraft
Formulating and Testing Strategic Doctrine
Doctrinal Considerations and Tactical Problems
The Planning Process and Operations
Conclusion
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
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