The development of RAF strategic bombing doctrine, 1919-1939
著者
書誌事項
The development of RAF strategic bombing doctrine, 1919-1939
(Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought)
Praeger, 1995
大学図書館所蔵 全2件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [175]-184) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The history of strategic bombing is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of strategic bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.
目次
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
Strategic Bombing as an Idea: The Relationship of Theory and Strategy
The Role of Theory
Early Experience with "Strategic" Air Power
The Foundations of Independent Air Power
The Theory of the Strategic Offensive and the Battles in Whitehall
The Development of Doctrine in the RAF
Equipment Policy and Aircraft Development
Equipping the Bomber Aircraft
Formulating and Testing Strategic Doctrine
Doctrinal Considerations and Tactical Problems
The Planning Process and Operations
Conclusion
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
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