Dynamic alliance auctions : a mechanism for Internet-based transportation markets
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Dynamic alliance auctions : a mechanism for Internet-based transportation markets
(Contributions to management science)
Physica-Verlag, c2004
Available at 5 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [145]-149)
Description and Table of Contents
Description
An introduction to the new auction format known as 'Dynamic Alliance Auctions' which has been developed for Internet-based transportation marketplaces. The format allows for a packagewise placement of transportation orders even if these orders stem from different shippers. This, in turn, increases utilization of truck capacity and reduces risk for carriers. It also results in bringing down transportation prices without shrinking margins. After examining the landscape of Internet-based transportation marketplaces, the book identifies vital characteristics and needs of transportation business. The book shows how Dynamic Alliance Auctions combine ideas of matching theory, auctions and bargaining to fit these needs. Finally, the performance of this auction format is investigated analytically and experimentally using a modified private-value framework and different informational settings.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction.- 1.1 Motivation.- 1.2 Environment and Aim of the Thesis.- 1.3 Contribution of the Thesis.- 1.4 Organization of the Thesis.- I Background.- 2 Theories.- 2.1 Axiomatic Models of Bargaining.- 2.1.1 The Basic Model.- 2.1.2 Literature on 2-Person Bargaining.- 2.1.3 Solution Concepts.- 2.1.4 A Note on the Strategic Approach to Bargaining.- 2.2 Auctions.- 2.2.1 Terminology.- 2.2.2 Literature on Auctions.- 2.2.3 Solution Concepts.- 2.2.4 Theoretical Models.- 2.2.5 Revenue, Efficiency, and Collusion in Private Value Auctions.- 2.2.6 Combinatorial Auctions.- 2.3 The Marriage Problem.- 2.3.1 Stability.- 2.3.2 Matching Procedures or Who-Proposes-to-Whom.- 2.3.3 Reporting Preferences.- 3 Internet-Based Freight Marketplaces.- 3.1 A Classification Scheme.- 3.1.1 Participants.- 3.1.2 Traded Goods.- 3.1.3 Trade.- 3.2 A Critical Analysis.- 3.2.1 The Blackboard Teleroute.- 3.2.2 The Auction House Benelog.- 3.2.3 The Exchange Eulox.- 3.2.4 Conclusion.- II Freight Auctions.- 4 Conventional Freight Auctions.- 4.1 Markets Considered.- 4.2 Empty Lanes.- 4.2.1 Standard Auctions & Cost Calculation.- 4.2.2 Combinatorial Auctions - No Solution to Spot Markets.- 4.3 Packagewize Placements.- 4.3.1 Imbalanced Flows of Goods.- 4.3.2 Monotony, Pareto-Optimality, and Reserve Prices.- 4.4 Conclusion.- 5 Dynamic Alliance Auctions.- 5.1 Stages of an Appropriate Mechanism.- 5.2 How Dynamic Alliance Auctions Work.- 5.2.1 The Basic Procedure.- 5.2.2 General Notation and Terms.- 5.2.3 The Rules of Dynamic Alliance Auctions.- 5.2.4 An Illustrative Example.- III Evaluation.- 6 Stages and Price Division.- 6.1 A Trade-off for Shippers.- 6.2 Collection Stage.- 6.3 Aggregation Stage.- 6.4 Placement Stage.- 6.5 Division of the Package Price.- 6.5.1 Axioms Satisfied.- 6.5.2 Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky.- 6.5.3 An Appropriate Weight.- 6.6 Summary.- 7 Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids.- 7.1 Why Investigate Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids.- 7.2 Paul.- 7.3 Polar Cases.- 7.3.1 Perfectly Balanced Flows.- 7.3.2 Perfectly Imbalanced Flows.- 7.4 Expected Payoff.- 7.4.1 If 1,51 and IS'I Are Common Knowledge.- 7.4.2 If Only the Total Number of Bidders is Common Knowledge.- 7.4.3 If the Number of Bidders is Unknown.- 7.4.4 Maximizing Payoff.- 7.5 Polar Case Equilibria and Intuitive Bidding Strategies.- 7.5.1 Breakdown of the Polar Case Equilibria.- 7.5.2 Intuition & Ad-hoc Strategies.- 7.6 Summary.- 8 Experiment.- 8.1 Experimental Design.- 8.1.1 Procedure.- 8.1.2 Information.- 8.1.3 General Remarks.- 8.2 Experimental Results.- 8.2.1 Average Payoffs and Revenue Efficiency.- 8.2.2 Bid-to-Value Ratios.- 8.2.3 Bids in T1 and T2: Intuition Revisited.- 8.2.4 Summary.- 9 Putting Insights to Practice.- A Proofs.- B Formulas.- B.1 Expected Payoff.- C Experiment.- C.1 Translated Instructions.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.- References.
by "Nielsen BookData"