Taking sides : clashing views on controversial legal issues

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書誌事項

Taking sides : clashing views on controversial legal issues

selected, edited, and with introductions by M. Ethan Katsh and William Rose

McGraw-Hill/Ducation, c2004

11th ed

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注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

This updated eleventh edition of "Taking Sides: Legal Issues" is designed to introduce students to controversies in the law. The readings, which represent the arguments of leading legal scholars, judges, and legal commentators, reflect a variety of viewpoints and are staged as "pro" and "con" debates. Issues debated include the operation of legal institutions; law and social values; and law and crime.

目次

PART 1. Law and the Individual ISSUE 1. Do "Standardless" Manual Recounts Violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution? YES: U.S. Supreme Court, from Per Curium Opinion, George W. Bush et al. v. Albert Gore, Jr., et al., U.S. Supreme Court (December 12, 2000) NO: John Paul Stevens, from Dissenting Opinion, George W. Bush et al. v. Albert Gore, Jr., et al., U.S. Supreme Court (December 12, 2000) The U.S. Supreme Court, in a per curium decision, rules that Florida's manual recounting of ballots in the 2000 presidential election failed to satisfy the basic constitutional requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness. Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens, dissenting from the Court's decision, asserts that the manner by which presidents are elected is the responsibility of each individual state and that Florida's ballot recount was not limited by federal laws. ISSUE 2. Is Abortion Protected by the Constitution? YES: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al. v. Casey et al., U.S. Supreme Court (1992) NO: William H. Rehnquist, from Dissenting Opinion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al. v. Casey et al., U.S. Supreme Court (1992) Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor upholds a woman's constitutional right to abortion under most circumstances and reaffirms the central holding of Roe v. Wade. Supreme Court chief justice William H. Rehnquist argues that Pennsylvania regulations on abortion should be upheld and that it is appropriate to overrule Roe v. Wade. ISSUE 3. Are Restrictions on Physician-Assisted Suicide Constitutional? YES: William H. Rehnquist, from Majority Opinion, Washington et al. v. Glucksberg et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 26, 1997) NO: Stephen Reinhardt, from Majority Opinion, Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1996) Supreme Court chief justice William H. Rehnquist rules that although patients have the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, physician-assisted suicide is not constitutionally protected. Judge Stephen Reinhardt argues that forbidding physician-assisted suicide in the cases of competent, terminally ill patients violates the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE 4. Do People Have a Legal Right to Clone Themselves? YES: Cass Sunstein, from "The Constitution and the Clone," in Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein, eds., Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning (W. W. Norton, 1998) NO: Cass Sunstein, from "The Constitution and the Clone," in Martha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein, eds., Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies About Human Cloning (W. W. Norton, 1998) Professor of law and political science Cass Sunstein, writing as fictional Supreme Court justice Monroe, argues that the right to cloning is analogous to established rights of reproductive privacy and autonomy and is therefore constitutionally protected. Professor of law and political science Cass Sunstein, writing as fictional Supreme Court justice Winston, argues that the constitutional protection of "reproductive choice" does not extend to the decision to replicate oneself. ISSUE 5. Does the Sharing of Music Files Through the Internet Violate Copyright Laws? YES: Robert R. Beezer, from Majority Opinion, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (February 12, 2001) NO: Jessica Litman et al., from Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors in Support of Reversal, Napster, Inc. v. A&M Records, Inc. and Napster, Inc. v. Jerry Leiber et al., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (August 2000) U.S. Circuit Court judge Robert R. Beezer upholds the ruling that Napster, Inc., by facilitating the copying and distribution of the plaintiffs' music recordings, is liable for contributory copyright infringement. Jessica Litman et al., all professors of American law, argue that the district court in the Napster case applied an unduly narrow interpretation of the fair use doctrine and extended copyright law to shut down a useful new technology. ISSUE 6. Should the Insanity Defense Be Abolished? YES: Jonathan Rowe, from "Why Liberals Should Hate the Insanity Defense," The Washington Monthly (May 1984) NO: Richard Bonnie, from Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (August 2, 1982) Editor Jonathan Rowe examines the insanity defense as it is now administered and finds that it is most likely to be used by white middle- or upper-class defendants and that its application is unfair and leads to unjust results. Professor of law Richard Bonnie argues that the abolition of the insanity defense would be immoral and would leave no alternative for those who are not responsible for their actions. ISSUE 7. Are Pretextual Stops by the Police Constitutional? YES: Antonin Scalia, from Majority Opinion, Whren et al. v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court (June 10, 1996) NO: David A. Harris, from "'Driving While Black' and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (vol. 87, no. 544, 1997) Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia holds that pretextual traffic stops do not violate an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. He argues that the constitutionality of such stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the police officer who makes the stop but on an objective determination of the reasonableness of the stop. David A. Harris, a professor of criminal law and criminal procedure, contends that Scalia's opinion ignores the potential for abuse by the police of general and all-encompassing traffic codes. PART 2. Law and the State ISSUE 8. Do Religious Groups Have a Right to Use Public School Facilities After Hours? YES: Clarence Thomas, from Majority Opinion, Good News Club et al. v. Milford Central School, U.S. Supreme Court (June 11, 2001) NO: David Souter, from Dissenting Opinion, Good News Club et al. v. Milford Central School, U.S. Supreme Court (June 11, 2001) Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas affirms the right of religious groups to use school facilities after the school day ends, maintaining that restricting such use is a violation of free speech rights. Supreme Court justice David Souter, dissenting from the Court's opinion, contends that the use of school facilities by religious groups blurs the line between public classroom instruction and private religious indoctrination and therefore violates the establishment clause of the Constitution. ISSUE 9. Does the Use of High-Technology Thermal Imaging Devices Violate the Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Guarantee? YES: Antonin Scalia, from Majority Opinion, Danny Lee Kyllo v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court (June 11, 2001) NO: John Paul Stevens, from Dissenting Opinion, Danny Lee Kyllo v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court (June 11, 2001) Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia maintains that thermal imaging devices reveal information "that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion" and that using such devices for surveillance without a warrant constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens asserts that the Court's application of search and seizure rules to new technology is too broad and that collecting thermal imaging data from outside the home is not a violation of privacy rights. ISSUE 10. Are Laws Requiring Schools and Public Libraries to Filter Internet Access Constitutional? YES: William H. Rehnquist, from Majority Opinion, United States et al. v. American Library Association, Inc. et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 23, 2003) NO: John Paul Stevens, from Dissenting Opinion, United States et al. v. American Library Association, Inc. et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 23, 2003) Supreme Court chief justice William H. Rehnquist rules that a federal law withholding funds from public libraries that fail to install filters on computers that are connected to the Internet does not violate the First Amendment. Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens argues that filters on computers that are connected to the Internet are flawed and that the Children's Internet Protection Act violates the First Amendment. ISSUE 11. Is It Constitutional to Impose the Death Penalty on the Mentally Retarded? YES: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Penry v. Lynaugh, U.S. Supreme Court (June 26, 1989) NO: American Bar Association, from Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner, Ernest Paul McCarver v. State of North Carolina, North Carolina Supreme Court (June 6, 2001) Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor holds that the Constitution does not preclude the execution of a mentally retarded person who is convicted of a capital offense. The American Bar Association, the principal voluntary national membership organization of the legal profession, argues that the Eighth Amendment should be held to exempt people with mental retardation from capital punishment. ISSUE 12. Is a Sentence of Life in Prison for Stealing $150 Worth of Videotapes Constitutional? YES: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, v. Leandro Andrade, U.S. Supreme Court (March 5, 2003) NO: David Souter, from Dissenting Opinion, Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, v. Leandro Andrade, U.S. Supreme Court (March 5, 2003) Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor rules that a decision in a case involving the theft of $150 worth of merchandise that resulted in two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction was not "grossly disproportional" to the crime nor "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." Supreme Court justice David Souter argues that, under several prior Supreme Court decisions, the "third strike" punishment in this case was grossly disproportional to the crime committed. ISSUE 13. Is Drug Use Testing of Students Who Participate in Extracurricular Activities Permitted Under the Fourth Amendment? YES: Clarence Thomas, from Majority Opinion, Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County et al. v. Lindsay Earls et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 27, 2002) NO: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, from Dissenting Opinion, Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County et al. v. Lindsay Earls et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 27, 2002) Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas finds that a school policy requiring all middle and high school students to consent to drug testing in order to participate in any extracurricular activity is a reasonable means of furthering the school district's interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissents, arguing that while testing student athletes may be justifiable, there is no justification for invading the privacy of students who participate in other extracurricular activities. PART 3. Law and the Community ISSUE 14. Can Companies That Lie About Their Business Practices Be Punished Without Having Their First Amendment Rights Violated? YES: Joyce L. Kennard, from Majority Opinion, Marc Kasky v. Nike, Inc. et al., California Supreme Court (May 2, 2002) NO: Janice Brown, from Dissenting Opinion, Marc Kasky v. Nike, Inc. et al., California Supreme Court (May 2, 2002) California Supreme Court justice Joyce L. Kennard argues that false claims about a company's business practices fall under the category of commercial speech, which the U.S. Supreme Court previously held is not constitutionally protected. California Supreme Court justice Janice Brown argues that it is unconstitutional to extend commercial speech laws to encompass potentially false claims about a company's labor practices. ISSUE 15. Are Blanket Prohibitions on Cross Burnings Unconstitutional? YES: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Virginia v. Barry Elton Black, Richard J. Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara, U.S. Supreme Court (April 7, 2003) NO: Clarence Thomas, from Dissenting Opinion, Virginia v. Barry Elton Black, Richard J. Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara, U.S. Supreme Court (April 7, 2003) Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor argues that a Virginia statute proscribing all forms of cross burning is unconstitutional because symbolic speech can only be prohibited when done with the intent to intimidate, and such an intent cannot be inferred solely from the type of symbolic speech used. Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas argues that the history and nature of cross burning in the United States inextricably links the act to threatening and menacing violence and that the intent to intimidate can therefore be inferred solely from the act of cross burning itself. ISSUE 16. Are Laws Criminalizing Homosexual Conduct Unconstitutional? YES: Anthony Kennedy, from Majority Opinion, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner v. Texas, U.S. Supreme Court (June 26, 2003) NO: Antonin Scalia, from Dissenting Opinion, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner v. Texas, U.S. Supreme Court (June 26, 2003) Supreme Court justice Anthony Kennedy rules that a Texas statute that makes it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia argues that the case of Bowers v. Hardwick should not be overruled and that Texas's prohibition of sodomy does not infringe a fundamental right. ISSUE 17. Are Public School Officials Liable for Damages in Cases of Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment? YES: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education et al., U.S. Supreme Court (May 24, 1999) NO: Anthony Kennedy, from Dissenting Opinion, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education et al., U.S. Supreme Court (May 24, 1999) Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor holds that under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, actions for private damages may be brought against school board officials in cases of student-on-student sexual harassment. Supreme Court justice Anthony Kennedy argues that Title IX cannot be read to provide such a cause of action and that to do so opens the gate for the federal government to intrude into state and local educational decision making. ISSUE 18. Should Children With Disabilities Be Provided With Extraordinary Care in Order to Attend Regular Classes in Public Schools? YES: John Paul Stevens, from Majority Opinion, Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., U.S. Supreme Court (March 3, 1999) NO: Clarence Thomas, from Dissenting Opinion, Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., U.S. Supreme Court (March 3, 1999) Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens interprets the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act as requiring public school districts to provide students who have severe physical disabilities with individualized and continuous nursing services during school hours. Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas argues that such an interpretation will impose serious and unanticipated financial obligations on the states. ISSUE 19. Do Race-Conscious Programs in Public University Admissions Policies Violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection Under the Law? YES: Clarence Thomas, from Dissenting Opinion, Barbara Grutter v. Lee Bollinger et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 23, 2003) NO: Sandra Day O'Connor, from Majority Opinion, Barbara Grutter v. Lee Bollinger et al., U.S. Supreme Court (June 23, 2003) Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas argues that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy discriminates on the basis of race and is therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor holds that the admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School, which makes race one factor among many in the process of creating a diverse student body, does not violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law.

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