The rational design of international institutions
著者
書誌事項
The rational design of international institutions
Cambridge University Press, 2004
- : pbk
- タイトル別名
-
International organization
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注記
First published 2001 by MIT Press on behalf of The IO Foundation as a specil issue of International organization, vol. 55, no. 4
Includes bibliographical references (p. 323-343)
内容説明・目次
内容説明
International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.
目次
- 1. The rational design of international institutions Barbara Koremenos et al.
- 2. Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement Andrew Kydd
- 3. The optimal design of international trade institutions: uncertainty and escape B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner
- 4. Most-favored-nation clauses and cluster negotiations Robert Pahre
- 5. Situation structure and institutional design: reciprocity, coercion, and exchange Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach
- 6. Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration Walter Mattli
- 7. Multilateralizing trade and payments in postwar Europe Thomas H. Oatley
- 8. The institutional features of the Prisoners of War Treaties James D. Morrow
- 9. Institutions for flying: how states built a market in international aviation service John E. Richards
- 10. Driving with the rearview mirror: on the rational science of institutional design Alexander Wendt
- 11. Rational design: looking back to move forward Barbara Koremenos et al.
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