Knowledge and demonstration : Aristotle's Posterior analytics
著者
書誌事項
Knowledge and demonstration : Aristotle's Posterior analytics
（The new synthese historical library, v. 56）
Kluwer Academic, c2004
- : hb
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-154) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This study explores the theoretical relationship between Aristotle's theory of syllogism and his conception of demonstrative knowledge. More specifically, I consider why Aristotle's theory of demonstration presupposes his theory of syllogism. In reconsidering the relationship between Aristotle's two Analytics, I modify this widely discussed question. The problem of the relationship between Aristotle's logic and his theory of proof is commonly approached from the standpoint of whether the theory of demonstration presupposes the theory of syllogism. By contrast, I assume the theoretical relationship between these two theories from the start. This assumption is based on much explicit textual evidence indicating that Aristotle considers the theory of demonstration a branch of the theory of syllogism. I see no textual reasons for doubting the theoretical relationship between Aristotle's two Analytics so I attempt to uncover here the common theoretical assumptions that relate the syllogistic form of reasoning to the cognitive state (i. e. , knowledge), which is attained through syllogistic inferences. This modification of the traditional approach reflects the wider objective of this essay. Unlike the traditional interpretation, which views the Posterior Analytics in light of scientific practice, this study aims to lay the foundation for a comprehensive interpretation of the Posterior Analytics, considering this work from a metaphysical perspective. One of my major assertions is that Aristotle's conception of substance is essential for a grasp of his theory of demonstration in general, and of the role of syllogistic logic in particular.
目次
Acknowledgements. Introduction. 1. Intellect as a First Principle. 1.1 The Ambiguity of the Term Arche. 1.2 Two Senses of Arche. 1.3 Induction and Intellect. 1.4 Induction. 1.5 Induction in the Posterior Analytics I.1 and the Prior Analytics II.21. 1.6 Induction in the Posterior Analytics II.19. 2. The Immediate Premiss. 2.1 Immediate Premisses and Skepticism. 2.2 Definitions and Hypotheses. 2.3 The Problem of the Modal Status of Hypotheses. 2.4 Hypotheses and the Principle of the Excluded Middle. 2.5 Demonstrative Necessity. 2.6 Hypothetical Knowledge versus Knowledge Simpliciter. 3. The Logic of Demonstration. 3.1 The Modern Exegesis of the Theory of Syllogism. 3.2 Syllogism and Hypothetical Deduction. 3.3 Syllogistic Consequence. 3.4 The Cognitive Value of Syllogistic Reasoning. 4. Syllogism and the Object of Knowledge. 4.1 The Discrepancy between Aristotle's Theory and Scientific Practice. 4.2 Syllogism and Greek Mathematical Reasoning. 4.3 Syllogistic Logic and the Principles of Demonstration. 4.4 The Objects of Mathematics and Syllogistic Reasoning. 4.5 Greek Mathematical Reasoning. 5. Knowledge and Demonstration. 5.1 Knowledge and Understanding. 5.2 Definition and Being. 5.3 Being and Essence. 5.4 Demonstration and Essence. 5.5 Aristotle's Concept of Knowledge. Conclusion. Select Bibliography. General Index.
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