Epistemology
著者
書誌事項
Epistemology
（Philosophical issues / edited by Enrique Villanueva, 14）
Blackwell, 2004
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注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This Volume contains main papers from a conference on epistemology and, in addition, especially invited papers on that topic. The volume contains twenty-three substantial papers by leading figures, who have vcontribut3d papers representative of their current work, plus a book symposium on Knowledge and Lotteries by John Hawthorne.
目次
A Naturalized Approach to the A Priori (Louise Antony). The A Priori Authority of Testimony (Robert Audi).
Externalist Justification without Reliability (Michael Bergmann).
Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience (Bill Brewer).
Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism (Earl Conee).
Truth Consequentialism, Withholding and Proportioning Belief to the Evidence (Michael R. Depaul).
True Enough (Catherine Z. Elgin).
Foundational Beliefs and Empirical Possibilities (Richard Feldman).
Epistemic Probability (Richard Fumerton).
Closure Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge (Peter Klein).
Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional (Hilary Kornblith).
Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge (Jonathan L. Kvanvig).
On Justifying and Being Justified. (Adam Leite).
Epistemic Circularity Again (Noah Lemos).
Epistemic Relativism (Steven Luper).
Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap (Ram Neta).
The Epistemology of Testimony (Duncan Pritchard).
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument (James Pryor).
What Is Wrong with Epistemic Circularity (Frederick F. Schmitt).
Internalist reliabilism (Matthias Steup).
Skeptical Arguments (Jonathan Vogel).
Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy.
Book Symposium.
Precis of Knowledge and Lotteries (John Hawthorne).
Knowledge, Assertion, and Practical Reasoning (Stewart Cohen).
Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries. (Gilbert Harman).
Speaking of Knowledge (Jonathan Vogel).
Replies (John Hawthorne)
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