Institutions, incentives and electoral participation in Japan : cross-level and cross-national perspectives
著者
書誌事項
Institutions, incentives and electoral participation in Japan : cross-level and cross-national perspectives
(The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies series)
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005
大学図書館所蔵 全40件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Includes bibliographical references (p. [132]-141) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
American and European political scientists have claimed that subnational elections almost always record lower voter turnout than national elections. In Japan, however, municipal elections often record considerably higher turnout than national elections, particularly in small towns and villages. Institutions, Incentives and Electoral Participation in Japan theoretically and empirically explores this puzzling 'turnout twist' phenomenon from comparative perspectives. Based on the rational-choice approach, the book hypothesizes that relative voter turnout in subnational vs. national elections is determined by the relative magnitudes of how much is at stake ('election significance') and how much votes count ('vote significance') in these elections.
目次
1. Introduction 2. Turnout Twist: Higher Voter Turnout in Lower-Level Elections 3. A Rational Choice Model of Relative Voter Turnout 4. Three Levels of Quantitative Tests 5. Culture or Institutions? Elections in a Traditional Society 6. Conclusion Appendix A. Cross-National Analysis: Data Sources Appendix B. French Communal Elections Appendix C. Survey Data Analysis: Question Wording and Coding Appendix D. A Single Vote Can be Decisive: Examples from Japan Bibliography
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