The regional roots of developmental politics in India : a divided leviathan
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The regional roots of developmental politics in India : a divided leviathan
(Contemporary Indian studies)
Indiana University Press, c2005
- : pbk
- : cloth
Available at 9 libraries
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  Iwate
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Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto Universityグローバル専攻
: pbkCOE-SA||332.25||Sin200025764261
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University Library for Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo図
: cloth333.825:Si85010308665
-
Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: pbkASII||711.2||R616597908
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 321-347) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
India is widely regarded as the most celebrated case of a 'failed' developmental state, seemingly the exception that belies the prediction of a triumphant Asian century. Its central political and economic institutions have been variously characterized as both 'soft' and 'strong' - at once weak, predatory, and interventionist. Aseema Sinha presents an innovative model that questions conventional views of economic development by showing that the Indian state is a divided leviathan: its developmental failure is the combined product of central-local interactions and political choices by regional elites.To develop this disaggregated model, she examines three regional states with sharply divergent development trajectories: Gujarat, West Bengal, and Tamil Nadu. Drawing on recent work in comparative political economy, the theory of nested games, incentive theory, and an ethnographic analysis of business actors, this study directs analytical attention at the creation of micro-institutions at the subnational level, explores the role of provinces in shaping investment flows, and considers the role of federalism as a mediating institution shaping the vertical strategies of provinces.
A comparative chapter applies the model to data from China, Brazil, Russia, and the former Soviet Union.
Table of Contents
- Part One: Introduction and Theoretical Framework 1. The Puzzle of Developmental Failure and Success
- 2. A Theory of Polycentric Hierarchy Part Two: National Level Analysis 3. Disaggregating the Central State Part Three: Subnational Variation Mapped 4. Regional Strategies toward the Dirigiste State
- 5. The Subnational State as a Developmental Actor
- 6. Weapons of the Strong: Business Responses in the Regions
- 7. Divided Loyalties: The Regional Politics of Divergence Part Four: India in Comparative Perspective 8. India in Comparative Perspective: Brazil, China, Former Soviet Union, and Russia
- Conclusion. Regional Landscapes and Economic Development in Dirigiste States
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