The economics of illegal immigration
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The economics of illegal immigration
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005
- : hardback
Available at 13 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
-
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: hardback334.4||Y8600997576
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 177-188) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book is an extensive review of the current state of illegal immigration in Europe and North America whilst providing theoretical analysis. This analysis models illegal immigration in a two-country framework, highlights the inter-related labour markets and considers a range of immigration policy instruments, including border patrols and employer surveillance and sanctions. Distinguishing between scenarios with and without the international mobility of capital, this book also examines various profit sharing arrangements. Other issues explored include: - The effectiveness of tighter border patrols and internal surveillance upon the level of illegal immigration - The effects upon national and international welfare - And optimal immigration policy choices
Table of Contents
Introduction PART I: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Absence of Capital Mobility The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility The Welfare Effects of Border Patrol on Illegal Immigration The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration Final Conclusion PART II: THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS The Optimal Enforcement of Immigration Law The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law Final Conclusion PART III: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF A PROFIT-SHARING POLICY Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing International Migration, Profit-Sharing and National Welfare Can a Profit-Sharing Scheme Remedy Large Scale Unemployment in a Less Developed Country?
by "Nielsen BookData"