Strategic behavior and policy choice on the U.S. Supreme Court
著者
書誌事項
Strategic behavior and policy choice on the U.S. Supreme Court
Stanford University Press, 2005
- : pbk
- : cloth
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-293) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Despite several decades of research on Supreme Court decision-making by specialists in judicial politics, there is no good answer to a key question: if each justice's behavior on the Court were motivated solely by some kind of "liberal" or "conservative" ideology, what patterns should be expected in the Court's decision-making practices and in the Court's final decisions? It is only when these patterns are identified in advance that political scientists will be able to empirically evaluate theories which assert that the justices' behavior is motivated by the pursuit of their personal policy preferences.
This book provides the first comprehensive and integrated model of how strategically rational Supreme Court justices should be expected to behave in all five stages of the Court's decision-making process. The authors' primary focus is on how each justice's wish to gain as desirable a final opinion as possible will affect his or her behavior at each stage of the decision-making process.
目次
@fmct:Contents @toc4:List of Figures and Tables Preface Acknowledgments @toc1:Part I: Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:1 Introduction @toc3:Plan of the Book @toc2:2 Seven Distinctions in the Literature @toc3:Distinction #1: A Psychological Metaphor vs. A Rational-Choice Metaphor Distinction #2: Theories of Attitude Activation vs. Theories of Rational Choice Distinction #3: Theories of Choice vs. Theories of Measurement Distinction #4: Explaining Final Votes vs. Explaining What Final Opinion Is Adopted Distinction #5: Explaining Just the Final Vote vs. Explaining All Five Stages of Decision-Making Distinction #6: Theories of "Sincere" Rational Choice vs. Theories of "Strategic" Rational Choice Distinction #7: A "Status-Quo" Policy vs. No "Status-Quo" Policy Conclusion @toc2:3 Assessing Previous Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc3:The Pioneers: Pritchett, Schubert, and Murphy Schubert's Attitude-Activation Model The Attitudinal Model Conceptual Problems with the Attitudinal Model Other Issues Involving the Attitudinal Model The Literature on Strategically-Rational Justices Conclusion @toc1:Part II: A Formal Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:4 Why Formal Models? @toc3:The Role of Theories and Models in Empirical Research Some Potential Benefits from Formal Modeling Potential Costs and Other Criticisms of Formal Modeling How Can We Be Sure That the Potential Benefits Exceed the Potential Costs? Conclusion @toc2:5 Definitions and Assumptions @toc3:Lines, Points, and Utility Functions The Status Quo Policy Preferred-To Sets and Win-Sets The Number of Justices An Informational Assumption "Sincere" and "Strategic" Behavior The Independence of Cases Joining, Concurring, and Dissenting Costless Opinion Writing Conclusion @toc2:6 Coalition Formation and the Final Vote @toc3:When Can the Status Quo Policy Be Upset? What Are the Constraints on the Set of Policies Which Could Be Adopted? What Policies Do Different Majority Coalitions Prefer to SQ? How Do Justices Behave When They Dislike the Majority Opinion? The Agenda-Control Version The Open-Bidding Version The Median-Holdout Version Comparison of the Agenda-Control, Open-Bidding, and Median-Holdout Versions Is Agenda-Control Behavior Unstable? Summary of Major Results @toc2:7 Opinion Assignment @toc3:Self-Assignment As An Opinion-Assignment Strategy Alternative Opinion-Assignment Strategies Opinion Assignment by a Justice Outside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Justice Inside WJmed(SQ) Opinion Assignment by a Minority-Side Justice Would An Opinion Assigner Prefer Larger Coalitions? How Much Does Opinion Assignment Matter? Summary of Major Results @toc2:8 The Conference Vote @toc3:Different Kinds of Strategic Behavior from Different Kinds of Justices Strategic Behavior by the Chief Justice Strategic Behavior by an Associate Justice Who Could Become the Opinion Assigner Strategic Behavior by a Low-Seniority Justice Who Cannot Become the Opinion Assigner What If Everyone Behaves Strategically? When Does the Chief Justice Self-Assign? Will the Chief Justice Trust What Other Justices Say on the Conference Vote? Summary of Major Results @toc2:9 Certiorari @toc3:Sincere Behavior on Certiorari Decisions Strategic Behavior on Certiorari Decisions "Aggressive Granting" and "Defensive Denial" When Justices Are Strategic Summary of Major Results @toc1:Part III: Future Directions for Theories of Supreme Court Decision-Making @toc2:10 Empirical Implications @toc3:Understanding the Five Stages of Supreme Court Decision-Making "Non-Strategic" or "Sincere" Behavior on the Supreme Court "Vote Switching" between the Original and Final Votes Problems of Empirical Measurement Conclusion @toc2:11 Future Research @toc3:Do the Justices Have Perfect Information about Each Other's Preferences? Do the Justices Always Have Clear and Fixed Preferences? Are Supreme Court Cases Independent from Each Other? Regular and Special Concurrences How Many Issue Dimensions Are There? Costly Opinion-Writing Extensions of the Model Exogenous Preferences and the Impact of "The Law" Broader Applications Conclusion @toc4:Notes References Index
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