Reliable partners : how democracies have made a separate peace
著者
書誌事項
Reliable partners : how democracies have made a separate peace
Princeton University Press, 2005, c2003
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全4件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Originally published: 2003
"First paperback printing, 2005"--T.p.verso
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Democracies often go to war but almost never against each other. Indeed, "the democratic peace" has become a catchphrase among scholars and even U.S. Presidents. But why do democracies avoid fighting each other? Reliable Partners offers the first systematic and definitive explanation. Examining decades of research and speculation on the subject and testing this against the history of relations between democracies over the last two centuries, Charles Lipson concludes that constitutional democracies have a "contracting advantage"--a unique ability to settle conflicts with each other by durable agreements. In so doing he forcefully counters realist claims that a regime's character is irrelevant to war and peace. Lipson argues that because democracies are confident their bargains will stick, they can negotiate effective settlements with each other rather than incur the great costs of war. Why are democracies more reliable partners? Because their politics are uniquely open to outside scrutiny and facilitate long-term commitments. They cannot easily bluff, deceive, or launch surprise attacks.
While this transparency weakens their bargaining position, it also makes their promises more credible--and more durable, for democracies are generally stable. Their leaders are constrained by constitutional rules, independent officials, and the political costs of abandoning public commitments. All this allows for solid bargains between democracies. When democracies contemplate breaking their agreements, their open debate gives partners advance notice and a chance to protect themselves. Hence agreements among democracies are less risky than those with nondemocratic states. Setting rigorous analysis in friendly, vigorous prose, Reliable Partners resolves longstanding questions about the democratic peace and highlights important new findings about democracies in world politics, from rivalries to alliances. Above all, it shows conclusively that democracies are uniquely adapted to seal enduring bargains with each other and thus avoid the blight of war.
目次
*FrontMatter, pg. i*Contents, pg. vii*Tables and Figures, pg. ix*Acknowledgments, pg. xi*1. The Argument in a Nutshell, pg. 1*2. Is There Really Peace among Democracies?, pg. 17*3. A Contracting Theory of the Democratic Peace and Its Alternatives, pg. 47*4. Why Democratic Bargains Are Reliable: Constitutions, Open Politics, and the Electorate, pg. 77*5. Leadership Succession as a Cause of War: The Structural Advantage of Democracies, pg. 112*6. Extending the Argument: Implications of Secure Contracting among Constitutional Democracies, pg. 139*7. Conclusion: Reliable Partners and Reliable Peace, pg. 169*Notes, pg. 191*Index, pg. 249
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