Logical pluralism
著者
書誌事項
Logical pluralism
Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 2006
- : hbk
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 129-136) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
-
: hbk ISBN 9780199288403
内容説明
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many.
目次
- I. PRELIMINARIES
- II. LOGICS
- III. OBJECTIONS, REPLIES, OTHER DIRECTIONS
- 巻冊次
-
: pbk ISBN 9780199288410
内容説明
Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline.
In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many
linguists as well as for philosophers.
目次
- I. PRELIMINARIES
- II. LOGICS
- III. OBJECTIONS, REPLIES, OTHER DIRECTIONS
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