Strategic competition in oligopolies with fluctuating demand

Author(s)

    • Neubecker, Leslie

Bibliographic Information

Strategic competition in oligopolies with fluctuating demand

Leslie Neubecker

(Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 569)

Springer, c2006

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. [213]-226)

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Dynamic oligopolistic competition has implications both for the strategic management of firms and for the design of an effective competition policy. Consequently, the present book considers the issue from a private and social perspective. It discusses the potential pro- and anticollusive effects of long-term business strategies, especially for cooperation and reinvestment in production, financing and management compensation, in markets with fluctuating demand. The method of supergame theory is applied to integrate long-run decisions and different types of demand into the analysis. Aside from its contributions to the theoretical literature, the book provides valuable insights into the design of competition policy. The observed development of prices is an indicator of the extent of collusion in the market and can thereby be used to assess antitrust regulation in certain business areas, and to focus the resources of competition authorities on markets where conditions are conducive to collusion.

Table of Contents

The State of the Research.- Empirical Evidence on Long-Term Competition.- Competition with Fluctuating Demand.- Strategic Investment with Fluctuating Demand.- Strategic Financing with Fluctuating Demand.- Strategic Management Compensation with Fluctuating Demand.- Discussion and Summary.

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Details

  • NCID
    BA74953959
  • ISBN
    • 3540295569
  • Country Code
    gw
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Berlin
  • Pages/Volumes
    ix, 233 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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