Iraqi security forces : a strategy for success
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Iraqi security forces : a strategy for success
Praeger Security International, 2006
Available at 2 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
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  Toyama
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  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
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  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
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  United Kingdom
  Germany
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Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
MEIQ||327.5||I2515877590
Note
Bibliography: p. [386]-410
"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."
Includes bibliographical references and index
HTTP:URL=http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005017188.html Information=Table of contents
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This volume documents both the initial mistakes and the changes in U.S. policy that now offer real hope of success in Iraq. Although the United States understood neither the strategic situation in Iraq, nor the value of Iraqi military, security, and police forces in fighting the growing insurgency, the country undertook a series of policy changes in June 2004 that may well correct these mistakes and create the kind of Iraqi forces that are vital to both Iraq's future and any successful reduction in Coalition forces and eventual withdrawal from Iraq.
In this book, Cordesman sets a number of U.S. policy priorities that must be attained if Iraqi forces are to be created at anything like the levels of strength and competence that are required. He is convinced that pursuing the right program consistently and with the right resources may well succeed in solving the security aspects of the nation-building problem in Iraq. The history of U.S. efforts to create Iraqi forces is a warning that Americans at every level need to think about what alliance and cooperation mean in creating allied forces for this kind of nation building and warfare. Iraq is only one example of how vital a role such forces must play in many forms of asymmetric warfare. What is equally clear is that Americans must understand that they have a moral and ethical responsibility to the forces they are creating.
Table of Contents
Introduction Initial Failures in Grand Strategy and Strategic Assessment: The Background to the Effort to Create Effective Iraqi Security Forces The Growth and Character of the Insurgent Threat US Training and Equipment Effort: The Failures of 2003 Failing to Deliver an Adequate Training and Equipment Program Through the Tenure of the CPA and Mid-2004 The Fall of 2004: The Effort to Train Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces Gathers Momentum The Status of Iraqi Forces in November 2004 End of 2004 As A Benchmark: Iraqi Security and Military Forces in December 2004 The Run Up to Elections: Iraqi Security and Military Forces in January 2005 Iraqi Military and Security Forces in the Spring of 2005 The Iraqi View: Emerging Iraqi Forces The Evolving Nature of the Insurgency Building the Future Appendix Chronology of Events Involving Iraqi Security Forces
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