Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court
著者
書誌事項
Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court
（Constitutionalism and democracy）
University of Virginia Press, 2006
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-313) and index
収録内容
- Statutory battles and constitutional wars : Congress and the Supreme Court / Andrew D. Martin
- Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators : accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference / James R. Rogers
- Institutions and independence in models of judicial review / Christopher Zorn
- "John Marshall has made his decision" : implementation, transparency, and public support / Georg Vanberg
- Court-state interactions : national judicial power and the dormant commerce clause / Clifford J. Carrubba and James R. Rogers
- A court of appeals in a rational-choice model of Supreme Court decision making / Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan
- Appeals mechanisms, litigant selection, and the structure of judicial hierarchies / Charles M. Cameron and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- Informative precedent and intrajudicial communications / Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson
- Decision making by an agent with multiple principals : environmental policy in the U.S. courts of appeals / Stefanie A. Lindquist and Susan B. Haire
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so.
In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government.
Contributors:
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum
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