When majorities fail : the Russian parliament, 1990-1993
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
When majorities fail : the Russian parliament, 1990-1993
(Political economy of institutions and decisions)
Cambridge University Press, 2006, c2002
- : pbk
Available at 5 libraries
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Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
: pbkEERU||328||W116873952
Note
Reprint. Originally published: Cambridge, U.K. : Cambridge University Press, 2002
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
When Majorities Fail is a study of institutional failure in Russia's first democratic legislature. Inadequate rules and a chaotic party system combined to make it nearly impossible to pass a coherent legislative program, including a new constitution. The internal instability in Russia's parliament is known as cycling, one of the most important theoretical concepts in formal study of legislatures. There are few recorded cases of cycling in politically important settings. This book documents the presence of cyclical majorities in Russian Parliament with comprehensive case and statistical analysis, and demonstrates how the failure to adopt a new constitution led to the confrontation between parliament and president in the fall of 1993. Earlier research has shown that the design of a legislative institution is crucial in preventing cycling. The author shows how the institutional design of the parliament failed, underscoring the importance of institutional design in a democratic transition.
Table of Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Cycling in action: Russia's constitutional crisis
- 3. Cycling and its consequences: a theoretical framework
- 4. Institutional design and implications for majority rule
- 5. Issue dimensions and partisan alliances
- 6. The structure of preferences
- 7. Legislative instability
- 8. The dynamics of agenda control in the Russian parliament
- 9. Implications of disequilibrium in transitional legislatures
- References
- Index.
by "Nielsen BookData"