Federalism, fiscal authority, and centralization in Latin America
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Federalism, fiscal authority, and centralization in Latin America
(Cambridge studies in comparative politics)
Cambridge University Press, 2006
- : hardback
Available at 16 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 249-267) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book explores the politics of fiscal authority, focusing on the centralization of taxation in Latin America during the twentieth century. The book studies this issue in great detail for the case of Mexico. The political (and fiscal) fragmentation associated with civil war at the beginning of the century was eventually transformed into a highly centralized regime. The analysis shows that fiscal centralization can best be studied as the consequence of a bargain struck between self-interested regional and national politicians. Fiscal centralization was more extreme in Mexico than in most other places in the world, but the challenges and problems tackled by Mexican politicians were not unique. The book thus analyzes fiscal centralization and the origins of intergovernmental financial transfers in the other Latin American federal regimes, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. The analysis sheds light on the factors that explain the consolidation of tax authority in developing countries.
Table of Contents
- 1. Federalism, party hegemony and the centralization of fiscal authority
- Part I. Fiscal Centralization in Mexico: 2. Regional fragmentation and failed commitment
- 3. The official party as a regional compromise
- 4. Nominations, veto players and gubernatorial stability
- 5. Transfers and redistribution in the Mexican States
- Part II. Centralization and Revenue-sharing in the Latin American Federations: 6. Venezuela: unitarianism in disguise
- 7. Argentina: regime change and fragile credibility
- 8. Brazil: the retention of fiscal authority
- 9. State building, political institutions, and fiscal authority.
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