CiNii Books - International handbook on the economics of corruption

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development. Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Soreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis

Contents: Introduction Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Soreide PART I: GENERAL OVERVIEWS 1. Corruption and Sustainable Development Toke S. Aidt 2. Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits PART II: PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION 3. Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences and Cures Bent Flyvbjerg and Eamonn Molloy 4. Corruption and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky 5. A Fighting Chance Against Corruption in Public Procurement? Gustavo Piga PART III: PRIVATIZATION AND SELF-DEALING IN PRIVATE FIRMS 6. Public versus Private Governance and Performance: Evidence from Public Utility Service Provision Maria Vagliasindi 7. Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption Emmanuelle Auriol and Stephane Straub 8. Risks of Wrongdoing in Public Companies and Ways to Cope with Them: The Case of Brazil Dante Mendes Aldrighi PART IV: PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 9. Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis 10. Is There an Anti-corruption Agenda in Regulation? Insights from Colombian and Zambian Water Regulation Frederic Boehm PART V: MICRO-ANALYTIC RESEARCH: HOUSEHOLD AND FIRMS 11. Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption Leonid V. Peisakhin 12. Oil, Corruption, and Vote-buying: A Review of the Case of Sao Tome and Principe Pedro C. Vicente 13. Conflict and Corruption in International Trade: Who Helped Iraq Circumvent United Nations Sanctions? Yujin Jeong and Robert J. Weiner 14. Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption Shawn Cole and Anh Tran 15. Does Respondent Reticence Affect the Results of Corruption Surveys? Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay and Peter Murrell PART VI: POLICY INITIATIVES: CRITIQUES AND EVALUATIONS 16. On Best and Not So Good Practices for Addressing High-level Corruption Worldwide: An Empirical Assessment Edgardo Buscaglia 17. Why Multi-Stakeholder Groups Succeed and Fail Rory Truex and Tina Soreide 18. 'Red Flags of Corruption' in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts Charles Kenny and Maria Musatova 19. Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption? Francesca Recanatini Index

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research. The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.

Contents: Introduction and Overview Susan Rose-Ackerman PART I: CORRUPTION AND POOR GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 1. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries? Johann Graf Lambsdorff 2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi 3. Measuring Institutions Christopher Woodruff PART II: CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 4. Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions Ray Fisman and Roberta Gatti 5. Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics Jana Kunicova 6. Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee 7. Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic Structure Ajit Mishra 8. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis Mushtaq H. Khan PART III: CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM 9. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Countries Alan Rousso and Franklin Steves 10. Corruption in China and Russia Compared: Different Legacies of Central Planning Jens Andvig PART IV: SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS 11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others? Jennifer Hunt 12. Corruption and the Demand for Regulating Capitalists Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch 13. Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of Norwegian Firms Tina Soreide 14. Laboratory Experiments on Corruption Klaus Abbink PART V: SECTORAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About It Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson 16. Corruption and the Management of Public Works in Italy Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci 17. Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 18. The Economics of Anti-Corruption: Lessons from a Widespread Customs Reform Dean Yang 19. Prescription for Abuse? Pharmaceutical Selection in Bulgarian Healthcare Patrick Meagher Index

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research. The Handbook begins with an introductory essay by the editor, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the Handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. These microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. The first group includes studies that link corrupt incentives to institutional structures, particularly the organization of the state. The second draws implications from surveys of households or businesses and from controlled experiments. The third concentrates on particular sectors such as education, tax administration, public works, customs services, and pharmaceuticals. Finally, two chapters assess corruption in the transition away from socialism in Europe and Asia.

Contents: Introduction and Overview Susan Rose-Ackerman PART I: CORRUPTION AND POOR GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 1. Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries? Johann Graf Lambsdorff 2. Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi 3. Measuring Institutions Christopher Woodruff PART II: CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 4. Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions Ray Fisman and Roberta Gatti 5. Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics Jana Kunicova 6. Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee 7. Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic Structure Ajit Mishra 8. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: The Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis Mushtaq H. Khan PART III: CORRUPTION IN THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM 9. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Programs: Preliminary Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition Countries Alan Rousso and Franklin Steves 10. Corruption in China and Russia Compared: Different Legacies of Central Planning Jens Andvig PART IV: SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS 11. Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others? Jennifer Hunt 12. Corruption and the Demand for Regulating Capitalists Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch 13. Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of Norwegian Firms Tina Soreide 14. Laboratory Experiments on Corruption Klaus Abbink PART V: SECTORAL ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES 15. How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About It Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson 16. Corruption and the Management of Public Works in Italy Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci 17. Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 18. The Economics of Anti-Corruption: Lessons from a Widespread Customs Reform Dean Yang 19. Prescription for Abuse? Pharmaceutical Selection in Bulgarian Healthcare Patrick Meagher Index

A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs.Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. This cutting-edge work will be an unmatched resource for scholars and students of corruption, professionals in international aid and finance organizations, and scholars and professionals with more general interests in economic and political development. Contributors: T.S. Aidt, D.M. Aldrighi, E. Auriol, F. Boehm, E. Buscaglia, B. Clausen, S. Cole, A. Estache, B. Flyvbjerg, Y. Jeong, C. Kenny, A. Kraay, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, E. Molloy, P. Murrell, M. Musatova, L.V. Peisakhin, G. Piga, J.D. Potter, F. Recanatini, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Soreide, S. Straub, M. Tavits, A. Tran, R. Truex, M. Vagliasindi, P.C. Vicente, R.J. Weiner, L. Wren-Lewis

Contents: Introduction Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Soreide PART I: GENERAL OVERVIEWS 1. Corruption and Sustainable Development Toke S. Aidt 2. Curbing Corruption with Political Institutions Joshua D. Potter and Margit Tavits PART II: PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION 3. Delusion, Deception and Corruption in Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences and Cures Bent Flyvbjerg and Eamonn Molloy 4. Corruption and Collusion: Strategic Complements in Procurement Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky 5. A Fighting Chance Against Corruption in Public Procurement? Gustavo Piga PART III: PRIVATIZATION AND SELF-DEALING IN PRIVATE FIRMS 6. Public versus Private Governance and Performance: Evidence from Public Utility Service Provision Maria Vagliasindi 7. Privatization of Rent-Generating Industries and Corruption Emmanuelle Auriol and Stephane Straub 8. Risks of Wrongdoing in Public Companies and Ways to Cope with Them: The Case of Brazil Dante Mendes Aldrighi PART IV: PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 9. Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis 10. Is There an Anti-corruption Agenda in Regulation? Insights from Colombian and Zambian Water Regulation Frederic Boehm PART V: MICRO-ANALYTIC RESEARCH: HOUSEHOLD AND FIRMS 11. Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption Leonid V. Peisakhin 12. Oil, Corruption, and Vote-buying: A Review of the Case of Sao Tome and Principe Pedro C. Vicente 13. Conflict and Corruption in International Trade: Who Helped Iraq Circumvent United Nations Sanctions? Yujin Jeong and Robert J. Weiner 14. Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption Shawn Cole and Anh Tran 15. Does Respondent Reticence Affect the Results of Corruption Surveys? Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria Bianca Clausen, Aart Kraay and Peter Murrell PART VI: POLICY INITIATIVES: CRITIQUES AND EVALUATIONS 16. On Best and Not So Good Practices for Addressing High-level Corruption Worldwide: An Empirical Assessment Edgardo Buscaglia 17. Why Multi-Stakeholder Groups Succeed and Fail Rory Truex and Tina Soreide 18. 'Red Flags of Corruption' in World Bank Projects: An Analysis of Infrastructure Contracts Charles Kenny and Maria Musatova 19. Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption? Francesca Recanatini Index

International handbook on the economics of corruption

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