Voting for autocracy : hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Voting for autocracy : hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(Cambridge studies in comparative politics)
Cambridge University Press, 2006
Available at 11 libraries
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Library, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization図
LCMX||324||V316593550
Note
Bibliography: p. 273-289
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This 2006 book provides a theory of the logic of survival of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), one of the most resilient autocratic regimes in the twentieth century. An autocratic regime hid behind the facade of elections that were held with clockwise precision. Although their outcome was totally predictable, elections were not hollow rituals. The PRI made millions of ordinary citizens vest their interests in the survival of the autocratic regime. Voters could not simply 'throw the rascals out of office' because their choices were constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compelled them to support the autocrats. The book also explores the factors that led to the demise of the PRI. The theory sheds light on the logic of 'electoral autocracies', among the most common type of autocracy, and is the only systematic treatment in the literature today dealing with this form of autocracy.
Table of Contents
- 1. Equilibrium party hegemony
- 2. Structural determinants of mass support
- 3. Budget cycles under autocracy
- 4. The politics of vote-buying
- 5. Judging economic performance in hard times
- 6. Ideological divisions in the opposition camp
- 7. How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas
- 8. Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions
- 9. Conclusion.
by "Nielsen BookData"