Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge : new essays on consciousness and physicalism
著者
書誌事項
Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge : new essays on consciousness and physicalism
（Philosophy of mind series）
Oxford University Press, 2007
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注記
Includes bibliographies and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
目次
Introduction
Part I: Phenomenal Knowledge
1: Daniel Dennett, Tufts University: What RoboMary Knows
2: Laurence Nemirow, Davis Graham & Stubbs Income Tax, Benefits & Estate Group: So This is What it's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis
3: Frank Jackson, Australian National University, British Academy, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and Fand Institut International de Philosophie: The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism
4: Torin Atler, The University of Alabama: Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?
5: Knut Nordby, formerly University of Oslo and Telnor Communications, Research and Development: What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know About Color?
Part II: Phenomenal Concepts
6: Janet Levin, University of Southern California: What is a Phenomenal Concept?
7: David Papineau, King's College, Cambridge University: Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts
8: Joseph Levine, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst: Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint
9: David Chalmers, Australian National University: Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
10: John Hawthorne, Rutgers University: Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia
11: Stephen White, Tufts University: Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise
12: Ned Block, New York University: Max Black's Ojbection to Mind-Brain Identity
13: Martine Nida-Rumelin, University of Fribourg: Grasping Phenomenal Properties
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