Oxford studies in metaethics

著者

• Shafer-Landau, Russ

書誌事項

Oxford studies in metaethics

edited by Russ Shafer-Landau

Clarendon Press , Oxford University Press, 2006-

• v. 1 : hbk
• v. 1 : pbk
• v. 2
• v. 2 : pbk
• v. 3 : hbk
• v. 3 : pbk
• v. 4 : hbk
• v. 4 : pbk
• v. 5 : hbk
• v. 5 : pbk
• v. 6 : hbk
• v. 6 : pbk
• v. 7 : hbk
• v. 7 : pbk
• v. 8 : hbk
• v. 8 : pbk
• v. 9 : hbk
• v. 9 : pbk
• v. 10 : hbk
• v. 10 : pbk
• v. 11 : hbk
• v. 11 : pbk
• v. 12 : hbk
• v. 12 : pbk
• v. 13 : hbk
• v. 13 : pbk
• v. 14 : pbk

注記

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

巻冊次

v. 2 ISBN 9780199218073

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship in the field. Its broad purview includes work at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1. Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination
• 2. An Outline of an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism
• 3. Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?
• 4. Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response
• 5. Moral Obligation and Accountability
• 6. Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics
• 7. Where the Laws Are
• 8. Practical Reasons and Moral <"Ought>"
• 9. The Humean Theory of Reasons
• 10. Responding to Normativity
• 11. Normativity

巻冊次

v. 1 : hbk ISBN 9780199291885

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• 1. Normative guidance
• 2. Saying what we mean: an argument against expressivism
• 3. Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no!
• 4. Anthropocentric constraints on human value
• 5. The meaning of the 'ought'
• 6. Knowing enough to disagree: a new response to the moral twin earth argument
• 7. Moral feelings and moral concepts
• 8. Negation for expressivists: a collection of problems with a suggestion for their solution
• 9. Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism
• 10. Misunderstanding metaethics: Korsgaard's rejection of realism
• 11. Resisting the buck-passing account of value
• 12. Normativity

巻冊次

v. 1 : pbk ISBN 9780199291892

内容説明

The contents of the inaugural volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics nicely mirror the variety of issues that make this area of philosophy so interesting. The volume opens with Peter Railton's exploration of some central features of normative guidance, the mental states that underwrite it, and its relationship to our reasons for feeling and acting. In the next offering, Terence Cuneo takes up the case against expressivism, arguing that its central account of the nature of moral judgments is badly mistaken. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, two of the most prominent contemporary expressivists, then offer their take on how expressivism manages to avoid a different objection-that of collapsing into an objectionable form of relativism. Daniel Jacobson and Justin D'Arms next offer an article that continues their research program devoted to exploring the extent to which values might depend upon, or be constrained by, human psychology. Ralph Wedgwood engages in some classical metaethical conceptual analysis, seeking to explicate the meaning of ought. Mark van Roojen then contributes a new take on the Moral Twin Earth Argument, a prominent anti-realist puzzle advanced in the early 1990s by Horgan and Timmons. Allan Gibbard next presents his latest thoughts on the nature of moral feelings and moral concepts, crucial elements in the overall project of defending the expressivism he is so well known for. James Dreier then takes up the details of Gibbard's recent efforts to provide a solution to what many view as the most serious difficulty for expressivism, namely, the Frege-Geach problem. Dreier identifies difficulties in Gibbard's expressivist account, and offers a suggestion for their solution. Sergio Tenenbaum explores the concept of a direction of fit, relied on so heavily nowadays in accounts of moral motivation. Nadeem Hussain and Nishiten Shah then consider the merits of Christine Korsgaard's influential critique of moral realism. T. M. Scanlon's widely-discussed buck-passing account of value attracts the critical eye of Pekka Vayrynen, who attempts to reveal the reasons that we might resist it. Derek Parfit's contribution concludes this volume, with an article on normativity that presents his most recent thinking on this fundamental notion.

目次

• 1. Normative guidance
• 2. Saying what we mean: an argument against expressivism
• 3. Expressivism, yes! Relativism, no!
• 4. Anthropocentric constraints on human value
• 5. The meaning of the 'ought'
• 6. Knowing enough to disagree: a new response to the moral twin earth argument
• 7. Moral feelings and moral concepts
• 8. Negation for expressivists: a collection of problems with a suggestion for their solution
• 9. Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism
• 10. Misunderstanding metaethics: Korsgaard's rejection of realism
• 11. Resisting the buck-passing account of value
• 12. Normativity

巻冊次

v. 3 : hbk ISBN 9780199542062

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1. The Significance of Desire
• 2. Fitting Attitudes and Welfare
• 3. The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement
• 4. Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise
• 5. Moral Dependence
• 6. Particularism and Supervenience
• 7. Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism and Normativity
• 8. Constructivism about Reasons
• 9. Rawls and Moral Psychology
• 10. Actions, Acting, and Acting Well
• 11. Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason

巻冊次

v. 3 : pbk ISBN 9780199542079

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1. The Significance of Desire
• 2. Fitting Attitudes and Welfare
• 3. The Argument from the Persistence of Moral Disagreement
• 4. Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise
• 5. Moral Dependence
• 6. Particularism and Supervenience
• 7. Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism and Normativity
• 8. Constructivism about Reasons
• 9. Rawls and Moral Psychology
• 10. Actions, Acting, and Acting Well
• 11. Hume on Practical Morality and Inert Reason

巻冊次

v. 5 : hbk ISBN 9780199588596

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• 1. Reason, Reasons and Normativity
• 2. Value and the Right Kind of Reason
• 3. Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity
• 4. Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge
• 5. How Objectivity Matters
• 6. When Do Goals Advance the Norms that Explain Them?
• 7. Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory
• 8. Humean Theories of Motivation
• 9. A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem
• 10. Categorizing Goods
• 11. Truth, Beauty and Goodness

巻冊次

v. 5 : pbk ISBN 9780199588602

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• 1. Reason, Reasons and Normativity
• 2. Value and the Right Kind of Reason
• 3. Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity
• 4. Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge
• 5. How Objectivity Matters
• 6. When Do Goals Advance the Norms that Explain Them?
• 7. Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory
• 8. Humean Theories of Motivation
• 9. A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem
• 10. Categorizing Goods
• 11. Truth, Beauty and Goodness

巻冊次

v. 8 : hbk ISBN 9780199678044

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1. The Relational Nature of the Good
• 2. Value and Reasons to Favor
• 3. On Being Social in Metaethics
• 4. Reasons, Commitment, and the Will
• 5. Two Dualisms of Practical Reason
• 6. On the (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge
• 7. Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem
• 8. Truth Conditions and the Meaning of Ethical Terms
• 9. Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism's Deflationary Gambit
• 10. Believing in Expressivism
• 11. Tempered Expressivism
• Index

巻冊次

v. 8 : pbk ISBN 9780199678051

内容説明

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

目次

• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1. The Relational Nature of the Good
• 2. Value and Reasons to Favor
• 3. On Being Social in Metaethics
• 4. Reasons, Commitment, and the Will
• 5. Two Dualisms of Practical Reason
• 6. On the (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge
• 7. Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem
• 8. Truth Conditions and the Meaning of Ethical Terms
• 9. Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism's Deflationary Gambit
• 10. Believing in Expressivism
• 11. Tempered Expressivism
• Index

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA80248725
• ISBN:
  • 9780199291885
  • 9780199291892
  • 9780199218073
  • 9780199218066
  • 9780199542062
  • 9780199542079
  • 9780199566303
  • 9780199566310
  • 9780199588596
  • 9780199588602
  • 9780199606375
  • 9780199606382
  • 9780199653492
  • 9780199653508
  • 9780199678044
  • 9780199678051
  • 9780198709299
  • 9780198709305
  • 9780198738695
  • 9780198738701
  • 9780198784647
  • 9780198784654
  • 9780198805076
  • 9780198805083
  • 9780198823841
  • 9780198823858
  • 9780198841456
• LCCN: 2006006149
• LCCN: 2015936890
• LCCN: 2018933810
• LCCN: 2019930897
• 出版国コード: uk
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Oxford,New York
• ページ数/冊数: v.
• 大きさ: 23 cm
• 分類:
  • LCC : BJ1012
  • DC22 : 170/.42
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Ethics