Regulating infrastructure : monopoly, contracts, and discretion
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Regulating infrastructure : monopoly, contracts, and discretion
Harvard University Press, 2006, c2003
- : pbk
Available at 5 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
"First Harvard University Press paperback edition, 2006" -- T.p. verso
Description and Table of Contents
Description
In the 1980s and '90s many countries turned to the private sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as gas, telephones, and highways-with the idea that market-based incentives would control costs and improve the quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles including the collapse of California's wholesale electricity market and the bankruptcy of Britain's largest railroad company have raised troubling questions about privatization. This book addresses one of the most vexing of these: how can government fairly and effectively regulate "natural monopolies"-those infrastructure and utility services whose technologies make competition impractical?
Rather than sticking to economics, Jose Gomez-Ibanez draws on history, politics, and a wealth of examples to provide a road map for various approaches to regulation. He makes a strong case for favoring market-oriented and contractual approaches-including private contracts between infrastructure providers and customers as well as concession contracts with the government acting as an intermediary-over those that grant government regulators substantial discretion. Contracts can provide stronger protection for infrastructure customers and suppliers-and greater opportunities to tailor services to their mutual advantage. In some cases, however, the requirements of the firms and their customers are too unpredictable for contracts to work, and alternative schemes may be needed.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 1. Monopoly as a Contracting Problem 2. The Choice of Regulatory Strategy Part I. Regulatory Politics and Dynamics 3. The Behavior of Regulatory Agencies 4. Capture and Instability: Sri Lankas Buses and U.S. Telephones 5. Incompleteness and Its Consequences: Argentinas Railroads 6. Forestalling Expropriation: Electricity in the Americas Part II. Contract versus Discretionary Regulation 7. The Evolution of Concession Contracts: Municipal Franchises in North America 8. The Rediscovery of Private Contracts: U.S. Railroad and Airline Deregulation--with John R. Meyer 9. Price-Cap Regulation: The British Water Industry Part III. Vertical Unbundling and Regulation 10. The Trade-off in Unbundling: Competition versus Coordination 11. Regulating Coordination: British Railroads 12. Designing Capacity Markets: Electricity in Argentina--with Martin Rodriguez-Pardina 13. The Prospects for Unbundling 14. The Future of Regulation Notes Index
by "Nielsen BookData"