Economics and Management of Networks : franchising, strategic alliances, and cooperatives
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Economics and Management of Networks : franchising, strategic alliances, and cooperatives
(Contributions to management science)
Physica-Verlag, c2007
Available at 8 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Other editors: George Hendrikse, Mika Tuunanen and Josef Windsperger
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Previous research on the institutional structure of franchising networks (Bri- ley et al. 1991; Lutz 1995; Shane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also residual income rights of franchisor-owned outlets. Previous studies primarily examines the incentive, signalling and screening effects of fees, royalties and other contractual pro- sions from the point of view of organizational economics (see Dnes 1996 for a review) without taking into account the interactions between residual decision and residual income rights as interrelated parts of the governance structure. This paper fills this gap in the literature. According to the property rights view, de- sion rights should be allocated according to the distribution of intangible kno- edge assets between the franchisor and franchisee and ownership rights should be assigned according to the residual decision rights. Since ownership rights are diluted in franchising networks, the dilution of residual income rights of fr- chised outlets is compensated by residual income rights of company-owned o- lets. Under a dual ownership structure, company-owned outlets compensate the disincentive effect of low royalties for the franchisor, and low royalties strengthen the investment incentives for the franchisee.
Table of Contents
Introducing 'Economics and Management of Networks'.- Introducing 'Economics and Management of Networks'.- Franchising.- Plural Form in Franchising: An Incomplete Contracting Approach.- Franchisee Versus Company Ownership - An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor Profit.- Existence of the Plural Form Within Franchised Networks: Some Early Results from the US and French Markets.- The Governance Structure of Franchising Firms: A Property Rights Approach.- Governance Inseparability in Franchising: Multi-case Study in France and Brazil.- Entrepreneurial Autonomy, Incentives, and Relational Governance in Franchise Chains.- Beneficially Constraining Franchisor's Power.- A Cointegration Analysis of the Correlates of Performance in Franchised Channels.- Franchised Network Efficiency: A DEA Application to US Networks.- Franchising as Entrepreneurial Activity: Finnish SME Policy Perspective.- Creating Franchised Businesses Through Franchisee Training Program - Empirical Evidence from a Follow-up Study.- Understanding Strategic Interactions in Franchise Relationships.- Strategic Alliances.- Administrative and Social Factors in the Governance Structure of European R&D Networks.- Firm and Industrial Organization Frontiers: An Empirical Model of Inter-firm Network in the Winter Sports Industry.- The Influence of Financial Institutions and Investor Behaviour on Company Management Practice.- International Audit Firms as Strategic Networks - The Evolution of Global Professional Service Firms.- International Joint Venture Performance: Impact of Performance Measures and Foreign Parent, Target Country and Investment Specific Variables on Performance.- Cooperatives.- Orientation in Diversification Behavior of Cooperatives: An Agent-Based Approach.- Organization and Strategy of Farmer Specialized Cooperatives in China.
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