Approval voting
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Approval voting
Springer, c2007
2nd ed
- : pbk
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Note
Rev. ed. of: Boston : Birkhäuser, c1983
Bibliography: p. 179-188
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book presents a simple and logical potential electoral reform. Under this system, voters may vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. Among the many benefits of approval voting are its propensity to elect the majority candidate, its relative invulnerability to insincere or strategic voting, and a probable increase in voter turnout.
Table of Contents
Introduction: Overview of the Problem and Its Solution.- Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness: Which System Is Most Honest?.- The Condorcet Criterion: Which System Best Finds the Majority Candidate?.- The Reconstruction of an Election under Alternative Rules.- Power and Equity: Which System Is Fairest?.- Deducing Condorcet Candidates from Election Data.- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections.- Recent Empirical Examples and Theoretical Extensions.- Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Presidential Election.- Epilogue.
by "Nielsen BookData"
